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Waiver of Statutory Requirements 
Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the many difficulties associated with the drafting of the Property 
Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) (‘the Act’) is the operation of s 365.  
If the requirements imposed by this section concerning the return of the 
executed contract are not complied with, the buyer and the seller will not be 
bound by the relevant contract and the cooling-off period will not commence.  
In these circumstances, it is clear that a buyer’s offer may be withdrawn.1  
However, the drafting of the Act creates a difficulty in that the ability of the 
seller to withdraw from the transaction prior to the parties being bound by the 
contract is not expressly provided by s 365. 
 
On one view, if the buyer is able to withdraw an offer at any time before 
receiving the prescribed contract documentation the seller also should not be 
bound by the contract until this time, notwithstanding that the seller may have 
been bound at common law.  However, an alternative analysis is that the 
legislative omission to provide the seller with a right of withdrawal may be 
deliberate given the statutory focus on buyer protection.  If this analysis were 
correct the seller would be denied the right to withdraw from the transaction 
after the contract was formed at common law (that is, after the seller had 
signed and the fact of signing had been communicated to the buyer).  
                                                 
1 Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) s 365(3). 
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Notwithstanding that a differential treatment of the buyer and seller could be 
suggested to be inconsistent with the opening words of s 365 (referring to 
both parties),2 Cullinane J expressed a tentative obiter preference for 
differential treatment in Grieve v Enge.3 
 
In discussing this passing judicial observation made by Cullinane J, the 
following comment was made in an earlier article: 
 
 In recent times there has been considerable publicity concerning the possibility of 
both buyers and sellers being able to escape contractual liability as a result of non-
compliance with the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act.  Although only 
expressed as a tentative conclusion, the comments of Cullinane J serve to highlight 
the cautious approach that legal practitioners should adopt when construing the 
provisions of Ch 11 of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act, being provisions 
enacted to provide a number of protections for buyers (rather than sellers) of 
Queensland residential property.4 
 
Greater guidance on this issue has now been provided with the judgment of 
Douglas J in Blackman v Milne.5  
                                                 
2 It is acknowledged that the material in this paragraph is consistent with comments made by the author 
elsewhere (as a co-author): SA Christensen, WM Dixon, WD Duncan and SE Jones, Land Contracts 
in Queensland (2004) Federation Press, Annandale (NSW) 116-117. 
3 [2006] QSC 37, [36]-[41].  Although Cullinane J’s judgment was upheld on appeal (Grieve v Enge 
[2006] QCA 213), the Court of Appeal (De Jersey CJ, McMurdo P and Helman J) did not opine on 
Cullinane J’s obiter observations on the effect of s 365. 
4 Bill Dixon, ‘A Significant Observation’ (2006) 26 Qld Lawyer 293, 296. 
5 [2006] QSC 350. 
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Facts 
 
In this instance, it was common ground that the seller’s agent (and the sellers) 
failed to direct the buyers’ attention to the warning statement as required by s 
365(2)(c)(ii) of the Act.  Wishing to accept a higher offer for the residential 
property in question, the sellers argued that the failure of the agent to comply 
with the statutory requirement prevented a binding contract from coming into 
existence.  For the buyers a submission was made that as the innocent party 
they could waive non-compliance with this statutory requirement.  To 
determine this issue, it was necessary for Douglas J to determine if the 
statutory provision created a private right merely for the private benefit of 
individuals such as the buyers (and was capable of waiver)6 or should, 
alternatively, be viewed as not being capable of waiver being a provision 
reflecting a public policy for the benefit of the community.7 
 
Decision 
 
Douglas J concluded that the buyers could waive the breach by the sellers 
and their agent of this statutory obligation: 
 
 It would be anomalous, in my view, if sellers could keep themselves from being 
bound to a contract by relying on their own omissions to comply with statutory 
provisions otherwise wholly for the benefit of purchasers where the purchasers do not 
                                                 
6 Re Permanent Trustee Nominees (Canberra) Ltd [1989] 1 Qd R 314, 322. 
7 See, eg, Lieberman v Morris (1944) 69 CLR 69. 
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wish to rely on those omissions to argue that no contract has come into existence.  
Such an approach does not reflect a public policy for the benefit of the community.   
 
 It seems to me, therefore, that the right in this case to have the buyers’ attention 
directed to the warning statement was a statutory right created for the buyers’ private 
benefit which they can, by their conduct, waive.  That the performance of that 
obligation also permits sellers to clarify when the parties are bound to a contract does 
not stop the sellers’ breach of the obligation from being characterised as a breach of 
a statutory right created for the buyers’ private benefit.8 
 
Comment 
 
It is suggested, with respect, that the conclusion reached by Douglas J is 
consistent with the focus of this part of the Act.  Practitioners should carefully 
consider this decision before providing any advice concerning the possibility 
of a seller being able to escape contractual liability as a result of non-
compliance with the Act by the seller or the seller’s agent. 
 
 
BD 
                                                 
8 Blackman v Milne [2006] QSC 350, [19]-[20]. 
